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Abstract- This study examine weather leverage can 
motivate company to manipulate their earnings in 
Indonesian manufacturing industry for the 
periods 2009-2011. Particularly, we use accrual 
earnings management and real earnings 
management to catch broader scope of earnings 
management. We also examined weather 
corporate strategy, namely diversification, have 
the moderating effect on the relationship between 
leverage and accrual earnings management. The 
number of samples of this research were 141 of 
manufacturing companies, which are selected 
using purposive sampling method. Our results 
suggest that leverage have a positive effect to 
accrual earnings management, but leverage have a 
negative effect to real earnings management. This 
study also find that diversification do not 
moderate the relationship between leverage and 
accrual earnings management. 
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The relationship between leverage and 
earnings management has been a concern for 
some researchers in financial accounting 
(Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Lobo and Zhou, 
2001; Klein, 2002; Gulet al.,2003; Chunget 
al.,2005, and Leeet al., 2007). In the accounting 
literature, the relationship between leverage and 
earnings management showed mixed results. 
Research conducted by Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), Klein (2002), and Gulet al.(2003) show 
thatleveragehas positive effect onearnings 
management.However, different results found 
by Lobo and Zhou (2001), Chung et al.(2005), 
and Leeet al. (2007) show that leverage 
negatively affect earnings management. 
Previous research that found a positive 
relationship between leverage andearnings 
management (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994; Klein, 2002, and Othman and 
Zhegal, 2006; to companies in France, but not 
for companies in Canada) stated that when 
leverage is high, the earnings management will 
be high and this is because the company strives 
to improve its bargaining position for 
negotiating the debt and reduce debt covenant 
violations. Previous studies found a negative 
relationship between leverage and earnings 
management (Chung et al, 2005; Lee et 
al, 2007) states that managers in companies that 
have leverage may be at the control of creditors, 
making it difficult for them to engage 
inearnings management. 
 In the development of today's business 
world, the complexity of the activities of the 
company arising from diversification. Based on 
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transparency diversification hypothesisis 
considered to have a complex organizational 
structure, thus increasing the high information 
asymmetry between companies 
and stakeholders (creditors). The state is used 
by management to engage earnings 
manipulation practices, so that diversification 
can strengthen the effect between leverage and 
earnings management. 
 The main objective of this study is to 
examine whether leverage can motivate 
company to manipulate their earnings in 
Indonesian manufacturing industry. Especially, 
we use accrual earnings management and real 
earnings management to catch broader scope of 
earnings management. This study motivated by 
two reasons. First, previous research linking 
betweenleverageandearnings managementare 
many.However, studies linking 
betweenleverageandearnings managementthat 
focuses on the strategy of the company in the 
form of diversification in Indonesia is still 
rarely studied.  Second, the relationship 
betweenleverageandearnings managementstill 
needs to be researched as Leuz et al. (2003) 
said. This study focuses on the pattern 
of increasing incomebecause the phenomenon 
of real earnings management more 
appropriately implemented on the pattern of 
increasing earnings (Januarsi, 2009). 
 





between leverage and earnings management can 
be described in agency theory. Agency 
relationship arises because the difference 
between the interests of creditors as principal 
and corporate management as the agent. Agent 
regarded as having better information than 
the principal will use this situation to take action 
that may affect reporting/performance. Agency 
theory perspective, transparency hypothesis 
assumes that diversification increases the 
complexity of the organization, which leads to 
high levels of information asymmetry between 
managers and suppliers of finance (Thomas, 
2002). Information asymmetry is high on 
diversified company able to provide the 
flexibility for managers to avoid creditor 
monitoring.  According to Indraswari (2010) 
companies with high leverage will offer 
accounting standards decrease or increase 
reported earnings. Thus the bargaining position 
will provide a relatively better in the negotiation 
or debt rescheduling company. Previous 
research that found a positive relationship 
between leverage and earnings management 
(Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; 
Klein, 2002, and Othman and Zhegal, 2006; to 
companies in France, but not for companies in 
Canada) stated that when leverage is high, the 
earnings management will be high and this is 
because the company strives to improve its 
bargaining position for negotiating the debt and 
reduce debt covenant violations. While previous 
studies that found a negative relationship 
between leverage and earnings management 
(Chung et al, 2005; Lee et al, 2007) states that 
managers in companies that have leverage may 
be at the control of creditors, making it difficult 
for them to engage inearnings management 
 
Hypothesis Development 
According to Scott (2003) one of the 
motivations managers to manipulate earnings 
because the company has a debt-covenant with 
others. The manager will improve the bottom 
line in order not to violate the credit agreement 
has been made, and in order to maintain the 
good name and reputation. Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), Klein (2002) find evidence 
thatleveragehas positive effect onincome 
increasing discretionary accruals. This is 
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because the company strives to improve its 
bargaining position for negotiating the debt and 
reduce debt covenant violations.However, 
research conducted by Chung et al. (2005) and 
Lee et al. (2007) found a negative relationship 
betweenleverageandincome increasing 
discretionary accruals.Previous research linking 
betweenleverageandearnings managementstill 
vague. On one hand, companies withleverageto 
face the control of creditors. Creditors always 
want the performance of the company is 
reflected in the financial statements are 
presented as they should either profit or loss. On 
the other hand, when a company wants to apply 
for new loans, the company trying to make its 
financial statements look good. Financial 
statements in order to perform well, the 
company is able to manipulate earnings. Efforts 
are made so that prospective lenders keen to 
lend its own funds and by the time the debt 
negotiation company can obtain the desired 
amount of debt. Based on the explanation 
above, the first hypothesis in this study are:  
 
H1: Leverage effect on accrual earnings 
management. 
 According to Jelinek (2007) debt tends 
to reduce discretionary accruals, the underlying 
reason for this opinion is when a company has a 
high level ofleverage, the company may face 
strict control from the lender, making it difficult 
for managers to manipulate 
accrualearnings.According Zagers-Mamedova 
(2009) conclusion from research conducted 
Jelinek (2007) may not be correct. Zagers-
Mamedova (2009) found that companies with 
highleveragewill reduce discretionary 
accrualsbecause managers may switch toreal 
earnings management.Roychodhury (2006) 
states that earnings management can be done in 
two ways, namely accrual earnings management 
and earnings management based on real 
events. However, only little literature examines 
the relationship between leverage and real 
earnings management. Zagers-Mamedova 
(2009) find evidence that firms with high long-
term debt are more likely to manipulate cash 
flow from operations. Thus, it can be concluded 
that companies with high leverage tend to 
reduce discretionary accrualand switch to real 
earnings management, because it's real activities 
manipulation through providing space for 
managers to influence the company's 
performance which is reflected in the financial 
statements. Based on the explanation above, the 
second hypothesis in this study are: 
 
H2: Leverage effect on real earnings 
management. 
 Information asymmetry tends to be 
more severe in a diversified company. Unlike 
the diversification strategy, focus strategy is 
seen much more transparent, the reported 
accounting numbers more informative (Best et 
al., 2004) and the activities within the company 
is not overly complex. Therefore, the 
asymmetry of information in focused companies 
lower than the diversified company.Thus, it can 
be concluded that the high levels of leveragecan 
motivate managers to manipulate earnings 
accruals and more motivated in a diversified 
company. Because the company has a 
diversified high information asymmetry, so 
flexibility is higher managers to manipulate 
earnings in the company while the managers 
flexibility strategy focus wane and aggravated 
due to the strategy. Based on the explanation 
above, the third hypothesis in this study are: 
 
H3: The effect of leverage on the accrual 
earnings management stronger in diversified 
companies  
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
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The data used in this study is a secondary 
data for the period 2009-2011. We obtain data 
from all the manufacturing companies listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) which 
have publish annual report ended on December 
31 during the observationperiods, have no 
merger activities, company consistently 
pursuing a strategy of diversification and focus 
during 2009-2011, and Presentation of financial 
statements in dollars.We also obtain firms that 
include in category income increasing EM. 
Determining the increasing EM 
company: corporate profits this year (NIt) are 
deflated by total assets of the previous year 
(TAt-1) as the dependent variable and profit last 
year (NIt-1) are deflated by total assets two years 
ago (TAt-2) as independent variables (Ardiyati, 
2003) and when formulated into: 
 
Formula :  NIt/TAt-1 = α + 
β1NIt-1/TAt-2 + e 
 
 From the model, the error that occurs is 
the difference between actual earnings to 
earnings expectations, is used to determine 
whether the company is in error positive or 
negative on error. If the error is positive, then 
the company is estimated to increase relative to 
the industry earnings (profits raised pattern), 
and if the error is negative, then the company 
did not increase earnings (earnings lower 
pattern). 
This research uses  regressionanalysis. The 
research model used in hypothesis testing are: 
 
Regression model for hypothesis 1: 
AEMit = α0 + α1LEVit + α2LOGTAit + 
α3EFTAXit + α4KUAit + Eit 
Regression model for hypothesis 2 : 
REMit = α0 + α1LEVit + α2LOGTAit + 
α3EFTAXit + α4KUAit + Eit 
Regression model for hypothesis 3 : 
AEMit = α0 + α1LEVit + α2DIVit + α3 |LEV-
DIVit| + α4LOGTAit + α5EFTAXit + α6KUAit 
+ Eit 
 
RESEARCH VARIABLES VARIABLE 
AND MEASUREMENT 
 
1. Accrual Earnings Management 
The dependent variable in this study is 
the accrual earnings management by using 
models modified Jones combined with the CFO 
or known by the model Kaznik (1999). The 
reason for the use of the model because, 
according to Siregar, et al. (2005) Kaznik 
models have adjusted R2the most high and the 
proportion of the sign according to predictions 
that can be considered better. 
 
2. Real Earnings Management 
 The next dependent variable isreal 
earnings management are proxied by abnormal 
cash flows from operating, abnormal production 
costs and abnormal discretionary expenses by 
using a model of Roychowdhury (2006). 
 
3. Leverage 
Leverage variable is the proportion of total debt 
to total assets. The ratio is used to provide an 
overview of the company's capital structure, so 
it can be seen the level of risk of uncollectible 
debts. 
 
4. Moderating Veriable : The company's 
strategy 
The company's strategy is a moderating 
variable betweenleverage and accrual earnings 
management. 
The measurement for assessing the company's 
strategy of simply ignoring the operating 
segments and geographic segments. The 
company's strategy is measured by the amount 
the company reported operating segments. If a 
company has only one product then the value of 
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the company's strategy is 1. However, when the 
company reported results of operations of the 
various products, the value of the company's 
strategy is the number of products/units 
produced by the company in 
accordance operation the reported segment 
reporting.  Measurements refer to the company's 




Here are the test results of multiple 





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
ZLEV (X1) .123 .002 -.088 .072 .030 .004 
ZDIV (X2)     .020 .050 
MODERASI [X1-X2]     -.003 .796 
ZLOGTA (X3) .007 .679 -.018 .405 -.007 .605 
ZEFTAX (X4) -.043 .649 .221 .059 -.006 .513 
ZKUA (X5) -.072 .003 .073 .015 -.026 .047 
 
First hypothesis shows that the 
manipulation of earnings by discretionary 
accruals showed significant positive β 1 value of 
0.123 with a significant level of 0.002 to accrual 
earnings management that results of this study 
support the hypothesis proposed by 
researchers. It can be concluded that the higher 
the leverage, the accrual earnings management 
will be higher.These findings are consistent 
with research conducted Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), Klein (2002) who found a positive 
relationship between leverage and income 
increasing discretionary accruals. Defond and 
Jiambalvo (1994), Klein (2002) states that 
managers in companies with high leverage will 
motivated to manipulate earnings accruals as the 
company strives to improve its bargaining 
position for negotiating the debt and reduce debt 
covenant violations. 
Second hypotheses shows that a 
significant negative impact to the value of β 1 at  
 
 
-0.088 a significant level of 0.072 to accrual 
earnings management that results of this study 
support the hypothesis proposed by 
researchers. It can be concluded that the higher 
the leverage the lower real earnings 
management. Based on the analysis, 
leveragenegatively affect earnings manipulation 
by real activity. Managers may be reluctant to 
take actions such as raising the discount, cutting 
discretionary spending, or by reducing the cost 
of production due to these efforts will only be 
beneficial in the short term. In the long term 
patterns of real earnings manipulation, will 
negatively impact future cash flows 
(Rhoychodhury, 2006). Therefore, managers in 
companies with high leverage tend to be 
reluctant to manipulate real earnings because 
managers are more concerned about the long-
term impact of real earnings manipulationthat 
tend to harm the company despite the 
manipulation of earnings rill provide flexibility 
for managers to manipulate earnings because it 
is difficult to detect by auditors . 
The third hypothesis shows that the 
company's strategy has an influence 
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on discretionary accruals management with 
β 2 of 0.020 with a significant level of 
0.050. However, the results of the interaction 
betweenleverageand diversification has no 
effect on accrual earnings management with 
β 3 -0.003 and a significance level of 0.796. It is 
concluded that a diversified company does not 
affect the behavior of managers to 
performaccrual earnings management when 
corporate leverage is high.The results of this 
study are not consistent with studies conducted 
Rodriguez-Perez and van Hemmen (2010) who 
found evidence that diversification affects the 
relationship between leverage and accrual 
earnings management. Thomas (2002), states 
that diversification does not always lead to 
higher information asymmetry due to the 
disclosures made by the 
management.Disclosures made by management 
regarding the company's business segments may 
provide insight to outsiders (creditors) so that 
high information asymmetry does not happen to 
companies that implement diversification 
strategies. It can be concluded that 
diversification does not strengthen the 
relationship between leverage and accrual 
earnings management due to the disclosures 
made by the management so as to reduce the 
information asymmetry between management 
and outside parties in this case is the creditors. 
 
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATION 
 
Based on the results of hypothesis 
testing that has been described previously, it can 
generally be concluded that the leverage effect 
on earnings manipulation practices both accrual 
and rill. Moreover, diversification does not 
moderate the effect of leverage on accrual 
earnings management. Information asymmetry 
is high on diversified company did not prove to 
be the higher the aggressiveness of the 
management to manipulate earnings, because, 
according to Thomas (2002) diversification 
does not always lead to higher information 
asymmetry due to the disclosures made by the 
management. The higher the disclosure made by 
the management, the lower the level of 
information asymmetry that occurs in a 
diversified company. This study does not escape 
from some limitations. First, previous studies 
examining the topic of diversification as 
moderating variables are infrequently studied, 
leading researchers difficult to compare results 
with previous studies. Second, the relatively 
small number of samples, from observations in 
2009-2011 only obtained a sample of 141 
manufacturing companies, so the researchers 
feel this research is less representative. Future 
studies are expected to examine other forms of 
diversification, diversification in this study were 
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